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MUNICIPALITY'S COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR POLICE TORTS
Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
An off-duty officer of the District of Columbia Police Department
became intoxicated and for no apparent reason shot plaintiff with his
service revolver.' Plaintiff sued the District of Columbia, alleging (a)
that the District was liable, either directly for its own negligence, or
vicariously for the negligence of the police chief, in hiring, training,
and supervising the policeman, and (b) that the District was vicariously
liable for the policeman's intentional tort by virtue of the agency theory
of respondeat superior.2 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the action,8 and
held: The District of Columbia is liable at common law to the vic-
tims of its policemen's torts.'
At early common law, municipalities were not liable for torts com-
mitted by their employees. 5  Later, in the nineteenth century, courts
1. Police regulations required that policemen carry their service revolvers at all
times. Manual of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia §
2.3:1 (1972).
2. Causes of action were also alleged against the police officer personally for an
intentional tort, against the police chief for negligence, and against the officer, the po-
lice chief, and the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See notes
3 & 4 infra. The officer was never served with process, however, and hence was not
a party to the litigation. Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
3. The actions against the District of Columbia and the police chief had been dis-
missed by the district court on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action was barred
by the one-year statute of limitations fod "wounding" in D.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-301(4)
(1973). 484 F.2d at 830.
4. 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court held that the applicable statute of
limitations was the three-year statute for negligence actions imposed by D.C. CoDF ANN.
§ 12-301(8) (1973), and therefore reversed the common law claims against the other
defendants. 484 F.2d at 833. The dismissals of the § 1983 claims, see note 2 supra,
were affirmed on the basis of District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973),
which held that the District is not a "state or territory" within the terms of that stat-
ute.
5. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788); cf. 1 W. BLAcK-
STONE, CoMMENTARms *246. Russell was incorporated into American law in
Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 (1812), Farnum v. Town of Con-
cord, 2 N.H. 392, 393 (1821), and Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Strader, 18 N.J.L.
108, 116 (Sup. Ct. 1840). Cf. Dargan v. Mayor of Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 (1858); Bailey
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in most jurisdictions drew a distinction between torts committed by mu-
nicipal employees in the course of proprietary activities, for which the
municipality was liable, and torts committed in the course of govern-
mental activities, for which the municipality remained immune from
liability.6
This distinction between governmental and proprietary activities is
still recognized in twenty-two jurisdictions.7  In these states, the opera-
v. Mayor of City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1842), af'd, 2 Denio 433
(Ct. Err. N.Y. 1845); Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841).
6. The terms "governmental" and "proprietary" were not widely used until the
twentieth century, but soon after the first decisions on municipal immunity were
handed down, the division of functions of municipal corporations was recognized. See,
e.g., Dargan v. Mayor of Mobile, 31 Ala. 469, 474 (1858); Jewett v. City of New
Haven, 38 Conn. 368, 377 (1871); Cook v. Mayor & Council, 54 Ga. 468, 469 (1875);
Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334, 338 (1883); Brinkmeyer v. City of Evansville,
29 Ind. 187, 191 (1867); Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495, 499 (1872); City of
Atchison v. Challiss, 9 Kan. 603, 613 (1872); Moulton v. Inhabitants of Scarborough
71 Me. 267, 270 (1880); Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 541,
545 (1860); City of Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84, 106 (1870).
The distinction between governmental and proprietary activities was stated by Pro-
fessor Prosser:
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed adequately only by
the government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in
character, and so immune from tort liability.
On the other hand, when the city performs a service which might as well be
provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenue
from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may
be liability . ..
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 979-81 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). See
also Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Mu-
nicipal Corporations, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 325 (1925).
7. See Bryant v. Mullins, 347 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (W.D. Va. 1972); City of Bay
Minette v. Quinley, 263 Ala. 188, 189-91, 82 So. 2d 192, 193-95 (1955); Walker v.
Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 204, 280 P.2d 649, 652 (1955); Lambert v. City of New Haven,
129 Conn. 647, 649, 30 A.2d 923, 925 (1943); Kelley v. Mayor & Council, 35 Del.
9, 13-14, 156 A. 867, 869 (Super. Ct. 1931); Lively v. City of Blackfoot, 91 Idaho 80,
82, 416 P.2d 27, 29 (1966); Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136, 139, 499 P.2d 527,
531 (1972); Bale v. Ryder, 286 A.2d 344 (Me. 1972); Wynkoop v. Mayor & Council,
159 Md. 194, 198-201, 150 A. 447, 448-50 (1930); Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320
Mass. 528, 536, 70 N.E.2d 241, 246 (1946); City of Meridian v. Beeman, 175 Miss.
527, 536, 166 So. 757, 758 (1936); Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401, 403
(Mo. 1948); Croom v. Town of Burgaw, 259 N.C. 60, 61, 129 S.E.2d 586, 587-88
(1963) (by implication); Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 343-44,
140 N.E. 164, 165 (1922); City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okla. 545, 547-48, 126 P.
727, 728 (1912), cited with approval in Oklahoma City v. Bailey, 405 P.2d 115, 117
(Okla. 1965), and Grimes v. City of Henryetta, 208 Okla. 217, 218, 254 P.2d 980,
981 (1953); Graysneck v. Heard, 422 Pa. 111, 113, 220 A.2d 893, 894 (1970); Buc-
holz v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 326-27, 91 N.W.2d 606, 608-09 (1958); Bur-
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tion of a police department is considered a governmental activity, either
on the theory that police work is done in the public interest,8 or that,
since municipalities are required by the state constitution to maintain
police departments, the department partakes of the state's sovereign im-
munity.9 Apart from the governmental-proprietary distinction as a
nett v. City of Houston, 422 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Wade v. Salt
Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 375, 353 P.2d 914, 915 (1960); Marshall v. Town of Brat-
tleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 421-22, 160 A.2d 762, 765-66 (1960); Haney v. Town of Rain-
elle, 125 W. Va. 397, 402, 25 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1943); Davis v. Board of Comm'rs,
495 P.2d 21, 24 (Wyo. 1972).
Some cases focus on the particular tortious police activity, and if that is proprietary,
hold the city liable. City of Anniston v. Hillman, 220 Ala. 505, 126 So. 169 (1930)
(police supervision of prisoners in street maintenance work held proprietary); Jones
v. Sioux City, 185 Iowa 1178, 1188, 170 N.W. 445, 449 (1919) (driving policemen to
their beats held proprietary); City of Meridian v. Beeman, 175 Miss. 527, 536, 166
So. 757, 758 (1936) (patrolling police beat held "corporate" rather than governmental
insofar as municipal ordinances required police to maintain lookout for defects in pub-
lic utilities); Carrington v. City of St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 215-16, 1 S.W. 240, 242
(1886) (municipality liable for injury caused by condition negligently maintained on
sidewalk by police); Levin v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 328, 331, 167 N.W. 214, 215
(1918) (policeman working as foreman of city garage held working in proprietary ca-
pacity); Oklahoma City v. Bailey, 405 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla. 1965) (policeman driving
police car home after work held proprietary); Oklahoma City v. Foster, 118 Okla. 120,
124, 247 P. 80, 83 (1926) (maintenance of police garage held proprietary); Bucholz
v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d 606 (1958) (police rifle range used
by public for recreational purposes held proprietary); Crow v. City of San Antonio, 157
Tex. 250, 253, 301 S.W.2d 628, 629 (1957) (police blocking traffic to help children
go to Bible class held proprietary).
8. McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 339, 62 P. 231, 231 (1900);
Kelley v. Mayor & Council, 35 Del. 9, 14, 156 A. 867, 869 (Super. Ct. 1931); McConnell
v. City of St. Charles, 204 S.W. 1075, 1075-76 (Mo. 1918); Aldrich v. City of Youngs-
town, 106 Ohio St. 342, 344, 140 N.E. 164, 165 (1922); City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34
Okla. 545, 547-48, 126 P. 727, 728 (1912), cited with approval in Oklahoma City v.
Bailey, 405 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla. 1965), and Grimes v. City of Henryetta, 208 Okla.
217, 218, 254 P.2d 980, 981 (1953); Owensby v. Morris, 79 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935); Brown's Adm'r v. Town of Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 300, 12 S.E. 707,
707 (1890), cited with approval in Haney v. Town of Rainelle, 125 W. Va. 397, 402, 25
S.E.2d 207, 210 (1943).
9. Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 172, 173-74 (1861); Stouffer v.
Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 500, 162 A.2d 378, 380 (1960); O'Rourke v. City of Sioux Falls,
4 S.D. 47, 51-52, 54 N.W. 1044, 1045-46 (1893), cited with approval in Bucholz v. City
of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 326, 91 N.W.2d 606, 608 (1958); Maffei v. Incorporated
Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 59, 338 P.2d 808, 817 (1959); cf. Wilde v. Inhab-
itants of Town of Madison, 145 Me. 83, 72 A.2d 635 (1950); Burch v. Hardwicke,
71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 24, 32-36 (1878), cited with approval in Bryant v. Mullins, 347 F.
Supp. 1282, 1284 (W.D. Va. 1972), and Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145,
148, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939) (dictum).
South Carolina holds that municipalities are immune from liability for police torts
on the ground of the state's sovereign immunity, but does not use the governmental-
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means for avoiding liability, some of these states refuse to hold munici-
palities liable for policemen's torts on an agency theory by reasoning
that police torts are necessarily outside the scope of employment.'
Other courts hold that they simply lack the power to overrule the im-
munity doctrine," while still other courts reason that they lack the
administrative competence to subject the diverse range of governmental
activities to tort liability.12 Whatever reasoning is used to justify the
proprietary distinction in police tort cases. McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C. 428,
433, 108 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1959).
10. Bryant v. Mullins, 347 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (W.D. Va. 1972) (alternative hold-
ing); McSheridan v. City of Talladega, 243 Ala. 162, 163, 8 So. 2d 831, 833, (1942);
Coker v. Sammons, 54 Del. 488, 493, 180 A.2d 622, 624 (Super. Ct. 1962); Peters
v. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654, 656, 20 P. 490, 491 (1889); Buttrick v. City of
Lowell, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 172, 174 (1861); Salazar v. Town of Bernalillo 62 N.M.
199, 202, 307 P.2d 186, 188 (1956); City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okla. 545, 547, 126
P. 727, 728 (1912), cited with approval in Oklahoma City v. Bailey, 405 P.2d 115, 117
(Okla. 1965), and Grimes v. City of Henryetta, 208 Okla. 217, 218, 254 P.2d 980, 981
(1953); Archer v. City of Cisco, 211 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
11. Gerber v. City of Worchester, 294 N.E.2d 451, 452 (Mass. 1973); Gentry v.
Town of Hot Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 668, 44 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1947); cf. State v. Balti-
more County, 218 Md. 271, 273, 146 A.2d 28, 29 (1958).
A reason often given for such holdings is that the state legislatures, by passing legis-
lation affecting certain areas of governmental immunity, preempt the entire field. See
Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1255-59, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53-55 (1968) (dissenting opin-
ion); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 221-24, 359 P.2d 457, 463-64,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95-96 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Parker v. City of Hutchinson,
196 Kan. 148, 152-54, 410 P.2d 347, 350-52 (1966); Montoya v. City of Albequerque,
82 N.M. 90, 95, 476 P.2d 60, 65 (1970); Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317, 322-24,
145 N.W.2d 524, 527-29 (1970). In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No.
302, 18 II. 2d 11, 16, 163 N.E.2d 89, 91, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959), however,
the Illinois Supreme Court believed that such legislation merely evidenced the legisla-
ture's dissatisfaction with the immunity rule.
Other courts agree with the reasoning of the court in Abeyta v. City & County, 165
Colo. 58, 59, 437 P.2d 67, 68 (1968), which held: "Once such a doctrine has become
so deeply embedded in the law of this state, it is the legislature which must change
it, and not the judiciary." See Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Ky.
1964); Kingfisher v. City of Forsyth, 132 Mont. 39, 45, 314 P.2d 876, 879-80 (1957);
McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C. 428, 433-36, 108 S.E.2d 825, 827-28 (1954).
In Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 43-44, 338 P.2d 808,
811 (1959), the court held:
Section 16-301, W.C.S. 1945, says the Common Law of England prior to the
fourth year of James I (1607) "shall be the rule of decision in this state."
Thus, by statute the doctrine of municipal immunity became the rule of deci-
sion in our state and it is only by statute that the doctrine should be abro-
gated.
Accord, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1255-56, 1268, 429 S.W.2d 45, 53, 59 (1968)
(dissenting opinions); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d
11, 29-30, 163 N.E.2d 89, 98 (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959).
12. Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 239, 353 P.2d 590, 608 (1960) (dissenting opin-
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immunity rule, it appears that some courts are motivated to retain the
rule by a fear that imposing liability on municipalities would precipi-
tate a flood of litigation's that would dissipate city treasuries.14
In fifteen jurisdictions, however, it has been held that municipalities
are liable for police torts.1 5 These jurisdictions have criticized the doc-
ion); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 MII. 2d 11, 35, 163 N.E.2d
89, 101, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Anderson v. Vander-
slice, 240 Miss. 55, 58, 126 So. 2d 522, 523 (1961); Fette v. St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d
446, 448 (Mo. 1963); Gossler v. City of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 313-14, 221 A.2d
242, 245 (1966); Coffman v. City of Pulaski, 220 Tenn. 642, 651, 422 S.W.2d 429, 432-
33 (1967); Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 846-47, 30 S.E.2d 726,
735 (1944).
Typical of the reasoning behind such a holding is the following statement in Bale
v. Ryder, 286 A.2d 344, 348 (Me. 1972):
As a Court we lack the ability to create a system such as the Federal Tort
Claims Act or to place limits upon the extent of liability in any case in which
experience might indicate such limits ought to be imposed.
We do not hold the purse strings. We have no power to levy taxes or other-
wise provide funds to meet liability which would result from a decision abro-
gating the immunity doctrine. The Legislature has the power, the capacity, and
the administrative machinery for conducting investigations and for giving con-
sideration to several plans which could be advanced to solve the problem with
relatively minor impact upon the municipal treasury.
This argument is presented in greater detail in Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1260-68,
429 S.W.2d 45, 56-59 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
13. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 37, 163
N.E.2d 89, 102, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Coffman v.
City of Pulaski, 220 Tenn. 642, 650, 422 S.W.2d 429, 433 (1967).
The court in Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 666, 231 N.E.2d
161, 172 (1967), noted this possibility but nevertheless overruled municipal immunity
from liability for police torts.
14. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1257, 1260-61, 429 S.W.2d 45, 54, 55 (1968)
(dissenting opinions); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 461, 468 n.6
(Mass. 1973); Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. 1948); Brown
v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 841, 168 S.W.2d 1080, 1083 (1943); Gossler v. City
of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 313, 221 A.2d 242, 244 (1966); Gentry v. Town of
Hot Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 666, 44 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1947); Coffman v. City of Pulaski,
220 Tenn. 642, 650, 422 S.W.2d 429, 433 (1967).
15. Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (vicarious lia-
bility for police intentional tort); Graham v. District of Columbia, 433 F.2d 536 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (negligent tort); Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alas. 1963)
(intentional tort); City of Phoenix v. Camfield, 97 Ariz. 316, 400 P.2d 115 (1965)
(negligent tort); City of Scottsdale v. Kokaska, 17 Ariz. App. 120, 495 P.2d 1327
(1972) (negligent tort); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355
(1967) (intentional tort under statute imposing vicarious liability for municipal em-
ployees' torts); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965) (punitive damages
not recoverable for police torts); City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965)
(liability on agency theory for police intentional tort); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (liability on agency theory for police negligent
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trine of municipal immunity in general,' and particularly the govern-
tort); Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d 597 (1967) (liability un-
der statute for police negligent tort); Strong v. Town of Lansing, - Iowa -, 179 N.W.
2d 365 (1970) (liability under statute); City of Lexington v. Yank, 431 S.W.2d 892
(Ky. 1968) (liability on agency theory for police intentional tort); Jones v. Anderson,
277 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 1973) (liability on agency theory for police intentional tort);
Jackson v. City of Detroit, 35 Mich. App. 591, 192 N.W.2d 658 (1971) (intentional
tort); Chapman v. City of Reno, 85 Nev. 365, 455 P.2d 618 (1969) (liability under
statute for police intentional tort); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 56 N.J. Super. 219, 152
A.2d 372 (1959) (municipality liable for police tort without regard to agency theory
upon showing that tort was within scope of policeman's employment and was proxi-
mately caused by some "active wrongdoing" by a high municipal official), a!f'd, 33
N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) (agency theory proposed as alternative basis for muni-
cipal liability for police negligent or intentional tort); Thain v. City of New York, 35
App. Div. 2d 545, 313 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1970), affd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 524, 280 N.E.2d
892, 330 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1973) (negligent tort); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261
A.2d 896 (1970) (negligent tort). See also notes 27 & 28 infra and accompanying
text.
16. Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 284, 316 P.2d
582, 585 (1957): "In Colorado, 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for dis-
cussion by students of mythology, but finds no haven or refuge in this Court." But
see Abeyta v. City & County, 165 Colo. 58, 437 P.2d 67 (1968); Faber v. State, 143
Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960); Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960);
City & County v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).
Sovereign immunity has been referred to as: a "defense . . . based on neither jus-
tice nor reason," Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 285,
118 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1962); "an anachronism that has long outlived its purpose, de-
sign, or reasoning," Newman v. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 490 P.2d 1079, 1081
(Okla. 1971) (dissenting opinion). Judge Musmanno, dissenting in Graysneck v.
Heard, 422 Pa. 111, 114-16, 220 A.2d 893, 895-96 (1966), referred to municipal im-
munity from tort liability as
an imperfect rule. Governmental immunity is so wrong In principle, so con-
trary to the most elementary principles of justice, and so opposed to the mod-
em and healthy doctrine that the government should not enjoy any privilege
denied to the people who constitute it, that this Court should welcome the
opportunity-any opportunity-to eradicate, abolish, and forever wipe out the
fallacious, unjust, cruel proposition that the king can do no wrong.
The immunity rule is said to be based on the idea that "the King can do no wrong,"
which has been characterized as un-American. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1250,
429 S.W.2d 45, 51 (1968), overruled by implication by AMK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901
(Supp. 1973); Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 228, 353 P.2d 590, 603 (1960) (dissenting
opinion); Graysneck v. Heard, 422 Pa. 111, 114, 220 A.2d 890, 895 (1966) (Mus-
manno, J., dissenting); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 30-31, 115 N.W.2d
618, 620 (1962).
The floodgates argument, see note 13 supra, and the possibility of financial disaster,
see note 14 supra, have been dismissed as unlikely or uncompelling compared to the
need to discourage police abuse of power and spread the loss evenly among the tax-
payers. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1246-50, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49-50 (1968),
overruled by implication by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1973); Scruggs v.
Hanes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 267, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355, 362 (1967); Molitor v. Kaneland
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mental-proprietary distinction, which is said to produce "legalistic dis-
tinctions only remotely related to fundamental considerations of munici-
pal tort responsibility. ' 17  Having concluded that the immunity rule
must be abolished, these courts reject the argument that they lack the
power to do so, reasoning that since the rule was created by courts,
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 21-24, 163 N.E.2d 89, 94-96, cert. denied,
362 U.S. 968 (1959); Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 666, 231
N.E.2d 169, 172 (1967); cf. Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35, 36, 369 P.2d
271, 272 (1962).
Some doubts have been expressed about the constitutionality of municipal immunity.
See Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 209-10, 230-32, 353 P.2d 590, 593, 604 (1960) (dis-
senting opinions); cf. Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972), noted in 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 716. Contra, Abeyta
v. City & County, 165 Colo. 58, 59-60, 437 P.2d 67, 68 (1968); Faber v. State, 143
Colo. 240, 241-42, 353 P.2d 609, 610 (1960).
17. Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 665, 231 N.E.2d 169,
171 (1967). Accord, Stone v. Arizona State Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 392-93,
381 P.2d 107, 112 (1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214, 359
P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961); Liber v. Flor, 143 Colo. 205, 218, 235, 353
P.2d 590, 597-98, 606 (1960) (dissenting opinions); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Il1. 2d 11, 17-18, 163 N.E.2d 89, 92, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968
(1959); Gossler v. City of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 315, 221 A.2d 242, 245 (1966)
(dissenting opinion); Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. Super. 166, 162 A.2d 314
(1960), affd, 34 NJ. 250, 168 A.2d 11 (1961); Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497,
506-07, 162 A.2d 378, 382-83 (1960) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 32-33, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621 (1962).
The governmental-proprietary distinction has caused typical line-drawing difficulties,
and the decisions often are inconsistent. In Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124
A. 273 (1924), a municipal garbage truck going to the municipal dump was held a
governmental activity, but in Hill v. Allentown Housing Author., 373 Pa. 92, 95 A.2d
519 (1953), the maintenance of a municipal dump was held proprietary. In Marshall
v. Town of Brattleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 423, 160 A.2d 762, 766 (1966), the court stated:
The application of thi' doctrine has produced anomalous results in particular
cases. In the case of Welsh v. Village of Rutland, supra, 56 Vt. 228
[(1883)], the plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries to his wife because
the ice upon which she slipped and fell was produced by water escaping from
a fire hydrant connected to the village water system while a routine thawing
operation was being carried out by the village firemen. But in Wagner v.
Village of Waterbury, 109 Vt. 368, 196 A. 745 [(1938)], the plaintiff pre-
vailed against the municipality for the death of his son on the grounds that
the ice which caused a car to skid and strike the son was on the highway
due to a leak in the village water main.
In Haney v. Town of Rainelle, 125 W. Va. 397, 25 S.E.2d 207 (1943), the court rec-
ognized that the town could be liable for injuries caused by negligent maintenance of
sidewalks, but held that because the walkway where plaintiff was injured led up to the
town police station, its maintenance was a governmental activity and therefore the town
was immune from liability for plaintiff's injuries. See generally Seasongood, Municipal
Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. Rav.
910 (1936); 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 716.
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it can be judicially overruled. 8
Prior to Marusa v. District of Columbia,'9 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit had ceased using the governmental-
proprietary distinction and had held the District of Columbia liable only
for torts arising out of ministerial as opposed to discretionary activi-
ties." The Marusa court did not mention the ministerial-discretionary
18. Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Parish v. Pitts,
244 Ark. 1239, 1251-53, 429 S.W.2d 45, 51-52 (1968), overruled by implication by
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1973); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.
2d 211, 218-19, 359 P.2d 457, 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1961); Liber v. Flor, 143
Colo. 205, 219, 353 P.2d 590, 598 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 25-27, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96, cert. denied,
362 U.S. 968 (1959); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Ky. 1964);
Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 284, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803
(1962); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 193, 162 A.2d 820, 832 (1960); Becker
v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 569-71, 261 A.2d 896, 900-01 (1970); Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 36-39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623-25 (1962).
Typical of the reasoning employed by these courts is that in Stone v. Arizona State
Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 393, 381 P.2d 107, 113 (1963):
[Wie realize that the doctrine of governmental immunity was originally ju-
dicially created. We are now convinced that a court-made rule, when unjust
or outmoded, does not necessarily become with age invulnerable to judicial
attack. This doctrine having been engrafted upon Arizona law by judicial
enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same process.
19. 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
20. The governmental-proprietary distinction as applied to police torts, see Capital
Trans. Co. v. District of Columbia, 225 F.2d 38, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1955), was modified
by dividing activities into discretionary and ministerial acts. Elgin v. District of Co-
lumbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Urow v. District of Columbia, 316 F.2d 351
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963). Since discretionary acts involve formu-
lating policy, subjecting them to judicial scrutiny would seriously interfere with the
quality and efficiency of government. Ministerial acts merely involve executing policy.
See Baker v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1200, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (unprovoked assault
by prison guard held ministerial); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(arrest without probable cause held ministerial); Graham v. District of Columbia, 433
F.2d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (arrest without probable cause and failure to supervise
jail adequately held not discretionary as a matter of law); Thomas v. Johnson, 295
F. Supp. 1025, 1031-32 (D.D.C. 1968) (hiring of policeman and police assault held
ministerial). But cf. Urow v. District of Columbia, 316 F.2d 351, 352 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 826 (1963) (failure to provide traffic control device at intersection
held discretionary).
Later, the District of Columbia Circuit used the discretionary-ministerial distinction
in police tort cases without mentioning the governmental-proprietary distinction. Baker
v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365-
68 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
It will be observed that the District of Columbia's pre-Marusa discretionary-minis-
terial distinction bears no relationship to the governmental-proprietary distinction. See
note 7 supra.
Two of the three jurisdictions applying a ministerial-discretionary distinction as a
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distinction, but instead spoke simply of the District's "duty to minimize
the risk"'" it had created by requiring its policemen to be armed at
all times. This duty demanded prudent hiring, training, and supervis-
ing procedures:
Thus, if the officer misuses his weapon, a judge or jury might reasonably
find that misuse to have been proximately caused by the government's
negligence in hiring, training, or supervising the policeman.22
The court rejected the argument that the Federal Tort Claims Act,2 3
which grants immunity to the federal government for most intentional
torts, indicates a congressional intent that immunity be extended to the
District of Columbia government.24  Similarly, the court rejected the
theory that the District's police department is necessarily a federal
agency simply because tort judgments against it are satisfied with fed-
eral funds.
test for municipal liability for employees' torts have given the distinction a much nar-
rower meaning than that used by the District of Columbia courts in the pre-Marusa
line of cases. See Boucher v. Fuhlbruck, 26 Conn. Supp. 79, 81-82, 213 A.2d 455,
457 (Super. Ct. 1965), in which the court defined a ministerial duty as
a duty which is to be performed by an official in a given state of facts in
a prescribed manner without regard to or in the exercise of his own judgment
or discretion upon the propriety of the act being done. A ministerial duty
might be illustrated in the factual situation where a town clerk must record an
instrument.
Accord, Patterson v. City of Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64, 67-68, 436 P.2d 613, 616 (1968)
(overruling the distinction and adopting an agency standard). See also McCorkle v.
City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969); Johnson
v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
21. 484F.2dat831.
22. Id.
23. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970), grants federal dis-
trict courts original jurisdiction over tort claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680 (1970), however, provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not ap-
ply to-
(a) ...a discretionary function or duty ....
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ar-
rest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.
24. Accord, Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Spencer v. Gen-
eral Hosp., 425 F.2d 479, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Contra, Graves v. District of Columbia,
287 A.2d 524, 525-27 (D.C. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
This argument is based on the unique relationship between the federal government
and the District of Columbia.
25. 484 F.2d at 832. But see Graves v. District of Columbia, 287 A.2d 524, 527
(D.C. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion). The court in the principal case noted that if the
source of funds were to determine whether a District government activity were local
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The court conceded that abolition of municipal immunity from lia-
bility for police torts might decrease police efficiency, 26 but stated:
[T]he threat of damage suits does not significantly impede the effective
operation of a police department, when the impediment is weighed
against the public interest in a tort remedy for police misconduct.27
In several states where courts have abrogated municipalities' immu-
nity from liability for their employees' torts, the legislatures have re-
sponded either by reinstating immunity to some degree s or by codify-
ing the judge-made liability. 29 Either alternative seems preferable to a
or federal, the District would have no local government at all. 484 F.2d at 832.
26. 484 F.2d at 832. The possibility that municipal liability for police torts would
impair police effectiveness was discussed in Graves v. District of Columbia, 287 A.2d
524, 527-28 (D.C. App. 1972); cf. Kingfisher v. City of Forsyth, 132 Mont. 39,
44, 314 P.2d 876, 879 (1957). But cf. Baker v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1200, 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
27. 484 F.2d at 832, quoting Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 363 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1971). For a similar balancing test, see Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 78, 447 P.2d
352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
28. ARK. STAT. ANIN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1973) (enacted following Parish v. Pitts,
244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968)); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (Supp. 1973) (im-
munity for intentional torts) (enacted following Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d
937 (1970)); N.J. REV. STAT. § 59:1-2 (Supp. 1973) (immunity for intentional torts)
(enacted following Peer v. Newark, 71 N.J. Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (1961)); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.43(3) (1966) (immunity for intentional torts) (enacted following
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)). See also
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-465 (1958) (immunity for intentional torts); GA. CODE
ANN. § 69-301 (1967), strictly construed in Thomas v. Williams, 105 Ga. App. 321,
124 S.E.2d 409 (1962), and City of Cumming v. Chastain, 97 Ga. App. 13, 102 S.E.2d
97 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-202 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (immunity for negli-
gent torts) (enacted following Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302,
18 I1. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959)), constitutionality up-
held in Arnolt v. City of Highland Park, 52 Ill. 2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144 (1972); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 23-2401 to -2409(5) (1970); N.M. STAT. A NN. § 14-9-7 (1953), con-
stued in Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 95, 476 P.2d 60, 65 (1970);
OKLA. STrAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1751-66 (Supp. 1972) (waiving immunity for cities over
200,000, but limiting recovery to $2,000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 to -34 (1953).
29. ALAS. STAT. § 09.65.070 (1962) (enacted following City of Fairbanks v. Schai-
ble. 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962)); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815-18.8 (Deering 1973) (en-
acted following Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961)); MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01-.17 (1963) (enacted following Spanel
v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962)); NEv.
REV. STAT. 0 41.031-.039 (1971) (enacted following Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev.
253. 382 P.2d 605 (1963)), liberally construed in State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d
591 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-31-1 to -7 (Supp. 1972) (enacted following
Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970)). See also IOWA CODE ANN. §
613A.2 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-4715 to -4716 (1972) (authorizing mu-
nicipalities to purchase liability insurance and waiving immunity to the extent of
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rule of blanket immunity that would appear increasingly anachronistic
in contemporary tort Idw.30 Marusa, by requiring the District of Co-
lumbia to compensate victims of its policemen's torts out of public reve-
nues, enhances the modem tendency to assign tort liability according
to considerations of risk-shifting and deep pockets rather than accord-
ing to fault.8
purchase); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.996(107) (1969), held unconstitutional in Maki
v. City of East Tawas, 385 Mich. 151, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971); MONT, REV.
CoDns ANN. § 83-706.1 (Supp. 1973); Act of April 10, 1929, ch. 467, § 12a, [1929]
N.Y. Laws 994 (codified at N.Y. Cr. CL. Acr § 8 (McKinney 1963)) (waiv-
ing state immunity), construed as waiving municipal immunity in Bernadine v.
City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 40-43-07 (1968) (same as Kansas); ORa. REv. STAT. H§ 30.260-.300 (1969); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6-640 (Supp. 1972) (liability for negligent torts); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.92.090 (1962) (waiving state immunity).
30. Fairweather, Test of Sovereign Immunity for Municipal Corporations, 13 CrEv.-
MAR. L. REV. 151 (1964); Green, Freedom of Litigation (111): Municipal Liability
for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1944); Mathes & Jones, Towards a "Scope of Offi-
cial Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. LJ. 889 (1965);
Price & Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA. L. REV.
330 (1953); Seasongood, supra note 17; Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police
Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV.
475 (1963); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 41 (1949); Van Al-
styne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919; Van
Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463
(1963).
31. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1247, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968):
The considered conclusion of legal commentators has been that this burden[of bearing the loss to the tort victim] should be treated as any other cost of
administration of municipal activity and thereby be spread by taxes among the
public receiving the benefits.
Cf. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 I1. 2d 11, 21-24, 163 N.E.
2d 89, 94-96, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959); Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141
Ind. App. 662, 666, 231 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1967).
The former, and contrary, view was expressed in 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw
96 (1881):
The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against
accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all its
members .... Universal insurance, if desired, can be better and more
cheaply accomplished by private enterprise.
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